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Abstract
Stanley Surrey, one of the most important figures in the
history of American tax law scholarship, was a member of the
Shoup Mission, which made a thorough recommendation on
revising the Japanese tax system after the Second World War. In
the Mission, he was in charge of modernizing Japan’s tax
administration system. Among other things, he recommended
implementing the Blue Return System, a set of incentives for
taxpayers to file their tax returns based on actual data on their
economic activities. As is well-known in Japan, the System
contributed significantly to the public’s acceptance of the selfassessment approach. However, it is less known that Stanley Surrey,
despite his original ideas that aimed at rationalizing the tax dispute
resolution system, happened to have a considerable influence on the
transformation of administrative law in Japan. This was especially
notable on the birth of a common law doctrine with respect to the
administrative agency’s duty to provide reasons in a wide range of
administrative determinations. In this article, the author points out
the following facts. First, in the Report of the Shoup Mission,
Surrey proposed several measures for mitigating tax disputes
between the government and the taxpayers. The proposal was
identical to one that he and Roger Traynor had previously put
forward to improve the federal tax administration of the United
States. Second, Surrey suggested that the taxpayer had to be
notified of the reason for an assessment of deficiency and that the
more comprehensively the tax office could investigate the taxpayer,
the more detailed reasons should be provided to him. However,
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Japanese lawmakers made the notification a privilege for blue
return filers, that is, for those who filed tax returns based on data
that recorded details of their economic activities. Third, the
Japanese judiciary followed the literal interpretation rule in
reading the statutory mandate to give reasons. Above all, the
Supreme Court of Japan in Udono, a 1963 decision, held that an
administrative determination sent to a taxpayer without sufficient
reasons should be revoked. The Court did so mainly because it
believed that the statutory mandate to notify the taxpayer of the
reasons embodied the spirit of due process and that to obey the
spirit, it was inevitable to sacrifice the collection of a correct
amount of tax in favor of ensuring the administrative agency’s
rational decision-making.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Meiji Restoration, American law has had an
enormous influence on Japanese law. 1 This was especially true
during the period when the Allied Powers occupied Japan just after
the Second World War (WWII), as American Law had
unprecedented impacts on Japanese law and society.2 It changed the
pattern of farmland ownership in Japan drastically. 3 It also
introduced US-style antitrust law in Japan.4 Part of the impact of
the policies pursued by the Allied Forces lasted long after the
occupation was terminated.

1 See, e.g., Kenzo Takayanagi, Reception and Influence of Occidental Legal Ideas in
Japan, in WESTERN INFLUENCES IN MODERN JAPAN: A SERIES OF PAPERS ON CULTURAL
RELATIONS 70, 80 (Inazo Nitobe, et al., 1931) (describing that in the early years of Meiji,
one of Japan’s main juristic sources was the US); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY
WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 67–80 (Donald Black ed., Studies of
Law and Social Control Ser., 1991).
2 See generally Thomas L. Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese Law,
1947 WIS. L. REV. 632 (1947); Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and
Judicial System under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 290 (1949).
3 See generally LAURENCE I. HEWES, JR., JAPAN: LAND AND MEN: AN ACCOUNT OF
THE JAPANESE LAND REFORM PROGRAM, 1945–51 (1955); RONALD DORE, LAND REFORM IN
JAPAN (1959); Mary G. McDonald, Agricultural Landholding in Japan: Fifty Years after
Land Reform, 28 GEOFORUM 55, 58 (1997); and Toshihiko Kawagoe, Agricultural Land
Reform in Postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper, No. WPS 2111, 1999),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/469971468771280762/Agricultural-landreform-in-postwar-Japan-experiences-and-issues [https://perma.cc/7FL4-NBA3].
4 See generally T. A. BISSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN (1954); Michiko
Ariga & Luvern V. Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH.
L. REV. 437 (1964); Kozo Yamamura, The Development of Anti-Monopoly Policy in Japan:
The Erosion of Japanese Anti-Monopoly, 1947–1967, 2 STUD. L. & ECON. DEV. 1 (1967);
ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970); Note, Trustbusting in Japan: Cartels
and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1065–68 (1981).
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The Blue Return System [aoiro shinkoku seido] is one
example. 5 It is a policy designed to give corporations and
individual business owners strong incentives to file their tax returns
according to their balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and
other documents.6 The Shoup Mission, in its 1949 Report on the
reforms of the Japanese tax system (hereinafter the “Report”), 7
advocated strongly in favor of the policy.8 By virtue of the policy,
now, more than 98 percent of the active corporations and more than
50 percent of the business owners in Japan file tax returns according
to their books and other documents. 9 This approach contributed

5 Monica Prasad, Avoiding the Aid Curse? Taxation and Development in Japan, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSNATIONAL TAX REFORM: THE SHOUP MISSION TO
JAPAN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 289, 293–94 (W. Elliot Brownlee et al. eds., 2013)
(describing positive evaluations of the Blue Return System).
6 Noboru Tanabe, Blue Return System in Japan, in READINGS ON INCOME TAX
ADMINISTRATION: A COMPREHENSIVE SELECTION OF MATERIALS ON INCOME TAX
ADMINISTRATION DRAWN FROM AROUND THE WORLD, SUPPLEMENTED BY TEXT, QUESTIONS,
AND PROBLEMS OF THE EDITORS 221, 221–29 (Patrick L. Kelley & Oliver Oldman eds.,
1973); Hideaki Sato & Masahiro Shibuya, The Role of Tax Administration and Collection,
in A FINAL DRAFT REPORT FROM FAIR TO THE WORLD BANK ON “TAXATION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH” (ASIAN MIRACLE PROJECT) 175, 181–83 (Foundation for Advanced
Information and Research, 1993); Justin Dabner, Japan’s Income Tax System: Lessons for
Australia, 11 REVENUE L. J. 1, 9–11 (2001).
7 GEN. HEADQUARTER SUP. COMMAND. ALLIED POWERS, REPORT ON JAPANESE
TAXATION
BY
THE
SHOUP
MISSION
VOLUME
I
AND
IV,
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/10288496
(last
visited
Nov.
11,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/2GWS-TVT8] [hereinafter Report].
8 For an overview of the Shoup Mission written in English, see generally Carl S.
Shoup, The Tax Mission to Japan, 1949–50, in TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
177 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989); HIROSHI KANEKO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE
TAX SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAR II, in A FINAL DRAFT REPORT FROM FAIR TO THE WORLD
BANK ON “TAXATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH” (ASIAN MIRACLE PROJECT) 7, 13–18
(Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Japan, 1993). For a thorough and
highly valuable analysis of the Shoup Mission, see generally W. Elliot Brownlee, The
American Occupation of Japan, the Shoup Mission, and the Transfer of Tax Ideas, 1945–
1952, in GLOBAl DEBATES ABOUT TAXATION 158 (Holger Nehring & Florian Schui eds.,
2007); W. Elliot Brownlee, The Shoup Mission to Japan: Two Political Economies
Intersect, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 237 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009); W. Elliot Brownlee, Shoup vs.
Dodge: Conflict over Tax Reform in Japan, 1947–1951, 47 KEIO ECON. STUD. 91 (2011);
W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
THE SHOUP MISSION TO JAPAN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXt (2013). See also Vicki L. Beyer,
The Legacy of the Shoup Mission: Taxation Inequities and Tax Reform in Japan, 10 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L. J. 388 (1992).
9 Masahiko Hino, Aoiro shinkoku seido no igi to kongo no arikata [The Blue Return
System’s Significance and Its Future], 60 Zeimu daigakko ronso 315, 344–47 (2009).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/1

176

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

significantly to the improvement of the tax administration system in
postwar Japan.10
The influence of the Blue Return System is not limited to
income tax. Since its inception, the system has had a considerable
impact on the development of administrative law in Japan.11 One of
the privileges available for blue return filers substantially
contributed to the emergence of an important doctrine in
administrative law. A blue return filer who keeps books and records
of his commercial activities and files tax returns supported by them
with official authorization for doing so, enjoys the privilege of being
informed of the reasons when the tax authorities try to assess a
deficiency12 in his tax liability.13 In the first two decades after the
WWII, the Supreme Court of Japan interpreted the requirement
literally. 14 In several decisions, it revoked assessments when
reasons were not expressed concretely in the letter of assessment.15

10 For an overview of the Japanese tax system written in English, see generally e.g.,
Hiroshi Kaneko, Japan: An Overview of Current Taxation Issues, 14 INTERTAX 32 (1986);
HIROMITSU ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM (3rd ed. 2001). For an introduction to
Japanese tax administration, see generally Koji Ishimura, Japanese Tax Litigation System
and Procedures, 13 LAW JAPAN 111 (1980); SATO & SHIBUYA, supra note 6; Vicki Beyer,
Tax Administration in Japan, 4 REVENUE L. J. 144 (1994).
11 See, e.g., Hiroshi Kaneko, Rule of Law and Japanese Tax Law 21–24 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author), https://jtri.or.jp/assets/pdf/about/information03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/73JF-EZH2] (discussing the improvement of tax procedures).
12 Unlike the US income tax, there is no notice of deficiency in the Japanese tax
system. If the Head of Tax Office finds deficiency in a taxpayer’s tax return, he
immediately makes an assessment [kōsei]. See Kokuzei tsūsoku hō [Act Regarding
General Rules for National Taxes], Law No. 66 of 1962, art. 24 (Japan). In practice,
however, the officer would first try to persuade the taxpayer to revise the tax return and
make an assessment only after he failed to persuade the taxpayer. The assessment is
generally deemed to be an example of the administrative dispositions [gyōsei shobun] or
the administrative acts [gyōsei kōi]. For the meaning of these two concepts, see e.g.,
Robert W. Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Justice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei as
a Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 37, 37–38 (1985). The
Report uses the term “reassessment” instead of “assessment” presumably because, in the
Report, an assessment refers to the taxpayer’s act of filing tax return. See REPORT, supra
note 7, at 217–20.
13 See Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, art. 155, ¶ 2 (Japan)
(providing that the Head of Tax Office should describe the reasons of assessment in the
letter of assessment); Hōjin zei hō [Corporate Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965, art. 130, ¶ 2
(Japan). See also DABNER, supra note 6, at 10; KANEKO, supra note 11, at 21–22.
14 KANEKO, supra note 11, at 22.
15 See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ]
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In these cases, the tax authorities were unable to make another
assessment for the taxable year because of the statute of limitations.
In essence, the Court prohibited the tax authorities from collecting
the correct amount of taxes from taxpayers in order to support their
privilege.16
Although the key legal issues in these cases centered on the
interpretation of some particular provisions in the tax statutes, the
Court implied that its decision was derived from a general principle
of administrative law. In Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho in 1963,
the leading case on this matter, the Court presented the following
broad statement:
In general, when a statute requires giving reasons in
administrative disposition [gyosei shobun], it does so
in order to ensure that administrative agencies make
careful and reasonable decisions and hence to avoid
their arbitrariness on one hand, and to benefit the
private parties in taking an appeal by informing them
the reasons for the decision on the other hand.
Therefore, when an administrative agency fails to
note down the reasons for a decision, the decision
itself should be revoked. The extent of reasons to be
given is determined with reference to the nature of
the disposition on one hand and the aim and purpose
of each provision in a statute that demands giving
reasons on the other hand.17
Furthermore, it reiterated what it held in the context of taxrelated matters in non-tax cases. It followed Udono entirely in the
1871 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1974, Sho 45 (gyō tsu) no. 36, 28 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 405 (Japan).
16 To compare with the state of affairs in the United States, see INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE § 7522(a) (1990) (providing that “an inadequate description” in a notice “shall not
invalidate such notice”) [hereinafter I.R.C.]. See also Michael Salzman & Leslie Book, IRS
Practice and Procedure, §10.03 [3][b] (description of the case law on the validity of a
notice).
17 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 620 (Japan). In Japan, a “revocable” administrative
disposition can be revoked not only by the administrative agency itself but also by the
courts. For the meaning of “revocable” administrative disposition in the tax contexts, see
Michael Matsukawa, Administrative Appeals from Tax Dispositions, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 91,
92 (1983).
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decision on a case in which a woman was suspected of a
relationship with the Japanese Red Army and was denied a passport
when she applied for it. 18 Citing Udono, the Court revoked the
Foreign Minister’s decision not to issue her a passport. Thus, the
Court established a common law doctrine: the lack of sufficient
reasons for an administrative disposition when a statute requires
giving reasons in administrative dispositions makes such a
disposition revocable.
In 1993, the Diet of Japan enacted the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 19 The APA includes two provisions on
giving reasons in making adverse dispositions. 20 It made giving
reasons mandatory across the board for two broad categories of
administrative dispositions.
Although the provisions were
apparently consistent with the existing common law doctrine on
giving reasons, it was not clear whether the doctrine survived under
the new act.21 In 2011, the Supreme Court, in the decision on a case
later known as the First-Class Architect case, held that it certainly
survives.22 In this case, without citing Udono, the Court found that
18

See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1985, Sho 57 (gyō tsu) no. 70, 39
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 (Japan).
19 See generally Gyōsei tetsuzuki hō [Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of
1993 (Japan). For an English translation of the act, see Mark A. Levin, Administrative
Procedure Law (Japan), 3 APLPJ 182 (2002). See also Lorenz Kodderitzsch, Japan’s New
Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons for Its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24
LAW JAPAN 105, 115–129 (1991) (providing an overview of the act); Takehisa Nakagawa,
Administrative Informality in Japan: Governmental Activities Outside Statutory
Authorization, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2000); Katsuya Uga, Development of the
Concepts of Transparency and Accountability in Japanese Administrative Law, in LAW IN
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 276 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2008) (describing the contents and
legislative history of the act); Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Transparency in Japanese
Administrative Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 233, 304 (analyzing policy
implication of the act).
20 Gyōsei tetsuzuki hō [Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of 1993, art. 8
(Japan) (discussing reasons in turning down of applications [shinsei]) & art.14 (discussing
reasons in making adverse dispositions [furieki shobun]).
21 Some commentators claimed that the common law would not survive because it
had deemed the failure to give reasons to be one of the defects or errors [kashi] in an
administrative disposition whereas the new act embodied the idea of procedural due
process. See e.g., Kazuaki Nishitoba, Riyu fuki hanrei hori to gyosei tetsuzuki ho no riyu
teiji-1, 112 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 851(1995); Kazuaki Nishitoba, Riyu fuki hanrei hori to
gyosei tetsuzuki ho no riyu teiji-2, 113 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 1 (1995).
22 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2011, Hei 21 (gyō hi) no. 91, 65 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2081 (Japan) (X1 v. Kuni [The Government]),
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1110 [https://perma.cc/87K9UK7S] [hereinafter First-Class Architect Case].
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the spirit of Article 14 of the APA was the same as that of the
common law doctrine. It revoked the decision by the Minister of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism because he had failed
to record sufficient reasons for his decision in the notification letter.
In sum, the Blue Return System had given birth to a firmly
established common law doctrine on giving reasons in Japan.
Until now, however, nobody has ever tried to find out the
true origin of the doctrine. 23 Rather, it is vaguely but widely
believed in Japan that the doctrine is derived from the principle of
due process of law, which is most famously embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.24
In this article, I will point out the following facts. First,
Stanley S. Surrey, one of the most important scholars in the field of
U.S. tax law, was the central figure in drafting the part of the Report
of the Shoup Mission on the administration of Japanese income
tax.25 Second, the arguments on the tax administration in the Report
bear a remarkable resemblance to the proposal for the reform of the
U.S. federal tax administration system, which Surrey submitted in
the late 1930s in collaboration with Roger J. Traynor, another
important figure in the history of tax law.26 At that time, they tried
hard to dissolve the serious congestion in the process of tax appeals.
Their proposal aimed at encouraging taxpayers to submit, as early as
possible, all the necessary information to determine their tax
23 Professor Shusaku Kitajima (Tohoku University) has written insightful articles on
the development the doctrine. See Shusaku Kitajima, Riyu teiji no teido to shobun kijun,
373 HOGAKU KYOSHITSU 49 (2011); Shusaku Kitajima, Riyu teiji hori no keisei to hatten,
58 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 160 (2012); Shusaku Kitajima, Gyosei tetsuzuki ho rippo katei
no okeru riyu teiji kitei, 59 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 126 (2013); Shusaku Kitajima, Gyosei
tetsuzuki ho seitei go no riyu teiji, 60 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 105 (2014); Shusaku Kitajima,
Ippan ho to shiteno gyosei tetsuzuki ho no kaishaku ni tsuite, 79 HOGAKU 133 (2015). But,
as of now, he has not yet written about the origin of the doctrine.
24 See, e.g., KANEKO, supra note 11, 21–24 (noting that the requirement that the
government explain the reasons for any reassessment is derived from the principle of due
process of law). See also Hiroshi Shiono, Gyosei shobun to riyu no fuki [Administrative
Dispositions and Giving Reasons], 1(3) JICHI JITSUMU SEMINA 36 (1962) (referring to the
Administrative Procedure Act of the United States and article 31 of the Constitution of
Japan (due process of law in criminal procedure) in contemplating whether the
administrative agency should explain the reasons for administrative dispositions). But see
NISHITOBA, supra note 21 (claiming that the common law doctrine did not stem from the
principle of due process, whereas the Administrative Procedure Act of Japan does).
25 Stanley S. Surrey was a former Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and a
specialist of taxation.
26 See infra text accompanying note 104 (providing a biography for Roger J. Traynor).
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liability. They argued that if taxpayers disclosed the information on
their economic affairs in the earlier stages of tax administration, the
number of tax controversies would be smaller because the tax
authorities would no longer have to send several notices of
deficiency without firm foundations. By comparing the Report with
the articles written by Traynor and Surrey, we now have a better
understanding of the original intent of Surrey’s proposal in the
Report. The goal of his proposal was to provide the most costeffective approach toward assessing and collecting income tax.
The original intent, thus found, will be contrasted with the
development of the common law doctrine on giving reasons. While
the doctrine has its origins in the Blue Return System proposed by
Surrey, the development of the doctrine has by no means been
consistent with his original intent.
This article is the first attempt ever to draw attention to this
inconsistency. It is also the first study on the Blue Return System
and the common law doctrine that originated from the system
through the academic works of Stanley Surrey. In the past, neither
administrative law scholars nor taxation law scholars, in the U.S. or
in Japan, has tried to trace the origins of the system and the genesis
of the doctrine.
To be sure, we already have very good analyses of the
influence of American lawyers and other foreign professionals on
Japanese administrative law in the period of occupation. Alfred
Oppler, a German jurist and one of the members of the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), looked back on the era
nearly 30 years later.27 John Haley, a specialist in Japanese law,
focused on the significance of the reform in administrative law and
analyzed the factors that blocked the reform, through research that
was partly based on Oppler’s memoirs.28 We also have Shin’ichi
Takayanagi’s articles in Japanese on the transformation of the
administrative litigation system in Japan under occupation.29
27 ALFRED CHRISTIAN OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT
LOOKS BACK 8 (1976).
28 John O. Haley, Toward a Reappraisal of the Occupation Legal Reforms:
Administrative Accountability, in EIBEIHO RONSHU: TANAKA HIDEO SENSEI KANREKI KINEN
543 (Koichiro Fujikura ed., 1987). See also John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law,
19 L. JAPAN 1 (1986) (providing an overview of the administrative law development in
post-war Japan).
29 Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Gyosei sosho hosei no kaikaku [Reforms on the
Administrative Litigation], 4 SENGO KAIKAKU [THE POSTWAR REFORMS] 291 (Tokyo
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More recently, scholars of economic history both in the U.S.
and in Japan published a book of excellent articles on the Shoup
Mission and its influence on the Japanese tax system.30 However,
the articles in the book refer to Stanley Surrey only on limited
occasions, presumably because they focus on the personal history of
Carl Shoup, the head of the Mission. Although one of the articles
carefully analyzes the key to the success of the Blue Return System,
it does not engage with the common law doctrine on giving
reasons.31
Even in Japan, nobody has ever tried to find out the effect of
the Report by the Shoup Mission on administrative law in postwar
Japan. Though the fact that the cases on the blue returns has created
a common law doctrine on giving reasons is widely known, all
comprehensive studies on the doctrine of giving reasons in
administrative law in general, for some reason, have chosen
jurisdictions other than the U.S. as a point of reference.32 Scholars
of law in the U.S. generally ignore the Japanese doctrine on giving
reasons probably because they do not find any counterpart in the
American law, where they deal not just with notice but also with
notice and hearings in general.33
daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo sengo kaikaku kenkyu kai ed., 1975); Shin’ichi
Takayanagi, Gyosei kokka sei yori shiho kokka sei he [From an Administrative State
System to a Judicial State System], 2 KOHO NO RIRON TANAKA JIRO SENSEI KOKI KINEN GE
2193 (Ichiro Ogawa ed., 1977); Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Sengo shoki no gyosei soshoho
kaikaku ron [The Discourses on the Reform of Administrative Litigation System in the
Early Postwar Era], 31 SHAKAI KAGAKU KENKYU 1 (1979). Narufumi Kadomatsu regards
Takayanagi’s trilogy as indispensable in studying the postwar judicial reforms. Narufumi
Kadomatsu, Gyosei ho tono kankei: Gyosei sosho seido wo megutte, 612 HOGAKU SEMINA
33, 37 (2005).
30 See generally BROWNLEE ET AL., supra note 8 (providing an overview of the Shoup
Mission in English).
31 PRASAD, supra note 5, at 293–97.
32 See, e.g., Shigeki Kubo, Furansu ni okeru gyosei koi no riyu fuki-1 [Giving
Reasons to the Administrative Dispositions in France], 87 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 703 (1983);
Shigeki Kubo, Furansu ni okeru gyosei koi no riyu fuki-2 [Giving Reasons to the
Administrative Dispositions in France], 87 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 855 (1983) (a comparative
study of Japanese law and French law); HISASHI KOKETSU, SHOBUN RIYU TO TORIKESHI
SOSHO [THE REASONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISPOSITIONS AND THE LITIGATION FOR THE
REVOCATION] (2000) (a comparative study of Japanese law and French law); Mamoru Suda,
Riyu teiji to shobun riyu [Giving Reasons and the Reasons for the Administrative
Disposition], 179 HOGAKU RONSO 1 (2016) (a comparative study of Japanese law and
German law).
33 See generally Nobushige Ukai & Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Protection of Property
Rights and Due Process of Law in the Japanese Constitution, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1129
(1968) (describing due process in Japanese property law with no analysis on giving
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This study is the first attempt to investigate the link between
the philosophy of American tax lawyers and the development of the
administrative law doctrine in Japan. In doing so, the author fills
the massive void left by the preceding studies.
The works of Traynor and Surrey give us important
implications on Japanese law and American law. The essence of
their arguments is that the procedural safeguards including giving
reasons are not worthwhile but are just a means to the end that
everyone pays one’s fair share. They place very little or no value on
giving reasons or, more generally, notice and hearing. For Japanese
law, their idea is contrasted with the orthodox understanding of
giving reasons, according to which they embody the procedural
rights of the people. For American law, their ideas may be
compared with the Supreme Court’s doctrine of reasoned
explanation.34 The Court applies the doctrine to all agency actions
including rulemaking and adjudication. 35 However, Traynor and
Surrey suggested that we might need different rationales for
rulemaking and adjudication in requiring reasoned explanations.
Their idea may have an effect on considering the issue of whether
the doctrine of reasoned explanation is applicable to a notice of
deficiency in the context of federal taxation.36
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I
present what Stanley Surrey proposed in the Report of the Shoup
Mission. I also briefly describe the Blue Return System and
compare it with the Report in this part. It will then become clear
that the Report supplied an integral component of the Blue Return
reasons); Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Yasuhiro Fujita, The Right to Fair Hearing in
Japanese Administrative Law, 45 WASH. L. REV. 273 (1970) (analyzing hearing right
without mentioning giving reasons); John K. M. Ohnesorge, Western Administrative Law
in Northeast Asia: A Comparativist’s History (June, 2002) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (on file with author’s publication page on Wisconsin-Madison Law
School website), https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/ngvjn/all.pdf. [https://perma.cc/D6QYGTN5] (discussing comparative administration law with no analysis on giving reasons).
34 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417–19 (1972);
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–46 (1983).
35 Id.
36 See QinetiQ US Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 845 F.3d 555 (4th
Cir. 2017) (holding that IRS’s notice of deficiency is not subject to Administrative
Procedure Act’s general requirement of reasoned explanation for final agency decision).
See also Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Reasoned-Explanation Rule and IRS Deficiency
Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331, 341–44 (2012) (insisting on the application of the rule to
notices of deficiency); Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63
DUKE L.J. 1771, 1793–95 (2014) (claiming that application is not advisable).
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System but there is a considerable difference between the Report
and the system. Among other things, the requirement of giving
reasons in an assessment became applicable only to the blue return
filers, despite Surrey’s original proposal in the Report, in which the
requirement was across the board. In Part II, I present what Traynor
and Surrey proposed in the Traynor Plan, which sought to relieve
the serious congestion in tax administration. The contemporary
debates over the plan are also introduced in brief. I then contrast the
plan with the Report to show that the Report is heavily indebted to
the Traynor Plan. In Part III, we return to Japan and see how case
law on the requirement of giving reasons has developed. We will
learn that the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, has
interpreted the requirement of providing reasons quite literally and
that the procedural rights of taxpayers was respected significantly in
this regard. I will examine what made the judiciary choose this
interpretation. I also analyze why Surrey’s original ideas did not
survive in the administration of the Blue Return System. In
conclusion, I locate our discussion in a broader context.

II.

SURREY’S PROPOSAL IN THE REPORT OF THE
SHOUP MISSION

In this part, I introduce the Shoup Mission briefly and
explain the circumstances under which the Mission was organized.
Then, I present Surrey’s proposal in the Report including the Blue
Return System.
A. The Shoup Mission
In 1945, soon after the WWII, General Douglas MacArthur,
the SCAP, ordered his personnel to start the first attempt at tax
reforms in Japan.37 The central component of this project was the
“Extraordinary Tax Program,” the purpose of which was “to level
off excessive concentrations of private wealth.”38 The program was
composed of a couple of one-time levies, the capital levy [zaisan
zei], and the war indemnity special tax [senji hosho tokubetsu zei],
37 See Henry Shavell, Postwar Taxation in Japan, 56 J. POL. ECON. 124, 130–34
(1948) (introducing Japan’s postwar tax development); Henry Shavell, Taxation Reform in
Occupied Japan, 1 NAT’L TAX J. 127, 131–34 (1948) (introducing Japan’s tax reforms).
38 SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 132 (explaining Taxation Reform in Occupied Japan).
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which was implemented in 1946.39 Despite its appearance as a tax
measure, it was in essence a confiscation of the economic value that
was acquired through the war. Thereafter, the members of the
project began to change the general framework of the Japanese
income tax system. As part of this general tax reform, they
proposed a self-assessment system instead of the traditional
government assessment. Self-assessment was introduced by the
newly enacted Income Tax Act of 1947. 40 However, the results
were disastrous.41 The government revealed its goal of tax revenue
and allotted the amount to the regional tax bureaus and tax offices.
Each tax office had to levy tax on the relatively affluent taxpayers in
its district in order to collect the allotted tax revenue. Tax officials
were forced to make assessments in many cases without reasonable
grounds and, quite reasonably, the taxpayers gave rise to a flood of
complaints.
It was around this time that MacArthur had asked L. Harold
Moss, an able tax official who was working for the US Army in
South Korea at that time, to join his team.42 Moss arrived in Japan
in April 1948. 43 With his help, General Douglas MacArthur
decided to start a more thorough reform of the tax system in Japan.44
Moss proposed that “a special mission of outstanding tax
economists” should “conduct a comprehensive survey of the

39

See generally Zaisan zei hō [Capital Levy Act], Law No. 52 of 1946 (Japan); Senji
hōsho tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on War Indemnity Special Measures], Law No. 38 of 1946
(Japan).
40 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 26 (Japan); SHAVELL,
supra note 37 (Postwar Taxation), at 134. For the definition and the characteristics of selfassessment, see KELLY & OLDMAN, supra note 6, at 203–20; Alan D. Liker, The Legal and
Institutional Framework of Tax Administration in Developing Countries, 14 UCLA L. REV.
240, 252–62 (1966).
41 KEIICHIRO HIRATA ET AL., SHOWA ZEISEI NO KAIKO TO TEMBO (I), 291–351(1979);
PRASAD, supra note 5, at 294–96 (describing the breakdown of Japanese tax administration
in 1949).
42 For the background of Moss, see W. Elliot Brownlee & Eisaku Ide, Shoup and the
Japan Mission: Organizing for Investigation, in BROWNLEE, ET AL. (eds) supra note 8, at
195–98 (introducing Moss’s background). For a more comprehensive analysis of the role
Moss played in the reform of tax administration in Japan, see Shunichiro Koyanagi, Sengo
zeimu gyosei no keisei to GHQ: Harold Moss shi no kouken [The Creation of Post-War
Tax Administration and GHQ: The Contribution of Harold Moss], in SEIICHI MORI, HO
BUNKA TOSHITENO SOZEI 111 (2015).
43 HIRATA ET AL., supra note 41, at 336; KOYANAGI, supra note 42, at 124.
44 Carl S. Shoup, The Tax Mission to Japan: 1949–50, in TAX REFORM IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 177 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989).
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national and local tax laws” and make a recommendation based on
the survey.45
The Shoup Mission, the core of MacArthur’s project
comprised seven members.46 First, Moss asked Carl S. Shoup to
become the leader of the mission.47 Then, Shoup chose six other
members, where there were four economists including Shoup
himself (Carl S. Shoup, Howard R. Bowen, William S. Vickrey, and
Jerome B. Cohen), two law professors (William C. Warren and
Stanley S. Surrey), and one state tax official at Minnesota (Rolland
F. Hatfield).48 Some of them arrived in Japan on May 10, 1949.
The others, including Surrey, arrived soon thereafter. Surrey, born
on October 3, 1910, was 38 years old at that time, and had been a
professor of jurisprudence at the University of California at
Berkeley for just two years.49 On May 30, Shoup announced how
he would allocate the work among the members.50 According to
Shoup’s plan, Surrey was in charge of “disposition of appeals and
matters on litigation.”51 The members first interviewed the people
in various social groups in Japan, and then prepared the drafts of the
Report in Karuizawa, Nagano. On August 26, 1949, the digest of
the Report was made public.52 The main text of the Report was
published on September 15 and the Appendix was disclosed on
October 3. On September 18, General MacArthur wrote a letter to
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida urging prompt action upon the
contents of the Report.53 Thus, the Report was supposed to be of
great importance to the implementation of tax reforms in Japan.
45

BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 198.
OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU [MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PUBLIC FINANCE HISTORY
OFFICE] (ED.), SHOWA ZAISEI SHI: SHUSEN KARA KOWA MADE [A HISTORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE IN THE SHOWA ERA: FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE TREATY] 429–46
(1977). For an extensive analysis of the Mission, see generally BROWNLEE ET AL., supra
note 8.
47 BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 198–201. OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU, supra
note 46, at 370.
48 BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 201–09.
49 For a memoir by Surrey himself, see STANLEY S. SURREY, THE ADVISORY TAX
MISSION TO JAPAN, in FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC AND TAX
DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE TO CONTROLLERS 19, 19–21 (1949).
50 OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU, supra note 46, at 442.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 648–59 (providing a Japanese version of Shoup’s comment). See generally
̄ YŌ : YOMIURI SHINBUNSHA, Aug. 27, 1949,
Yomiuri Shimbun, Yomidas Rekishikan, TOK
Morning Ed., at 1.
53 Jerome B. Cohen, Tax Reform in Japan, 18 FAR EASTERN SURVEY 307, 307 (1949).
46
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B. Surrey’s Proposal
Chapter 14 of the Report, titled “Compliance, Enforcement,
and Appeal under the Income Taxes,” is dedicated to proposals to
improve the tax administration in Japan. Appendix D of the Report,
titled “Administration of the Individual and Corporate Income
Taxes,” supplements these proposals. Though the Report does not
make the author of each part public, it is strongly inferred from
Shoup’s announcement dated on May 30, 1949 that Stanley Surrey
was the author of these parts.54
Chapter 14 comprised 14 sections. Appendix D was divided
into six sections, under which there are 27 subsections. Although
the proposals include secondary matters such as scholarly interest in
taxation, most of them are concerned with one of two issues, namely
the increased role of taxpayers and improvements in the machinery
of tax authorities. 55 Hereinafter, I will show you what Surrey
asserted on both points.
1.

The Taxpayers’ Role

Until around the time the Mission arrived in Japan, the role
taxpayers played in tax administration was rather limited. They
were supposed to play an important role per the law, but in practice,
they did not. Even under the system of assessment by the
government until 1946, a taxpayer was obliged to notify the tax
office of the amount of income for each type of income. 56
Nevertheless, taxpayers had very little incentive to file returns with
the correct amount of income because the authority of the tax
officials in the examination of the amount of income was extremely
restricted, as we will explain in the next subsection.57 Under the
newly introduced self-assessment system, there still seemed to be
little incentive on part of the taxpayers to file returns with the
correct amount of tax because the number of tax officials was small
54

See text accompanying supra note 46.
REPORT, supra note 7, at 226–27.
56 See, e.g., Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 24 of 1940, art. 34 (Japan)
(stipulating the obligation of individual taxpayers to file the amount of income); Hōjin zei
hō [Corporate Income Tax Act], Law No. 25 of 1940, art. 18 (Japan) (stipulating that a
corporation has duty to file the amount of income and the amount of capital, as well as its
balance sheet, profit and loss statement, etc.).
57 See infra text accompanying notes 64–74.
55
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on the one hand and the tax offices made reassessments without
reasonable foundations to reach the goal of tax revenue on the
other.58 The following proposal on the taxpayers’ role by Surrey
appeared against this backdrop.
Surrey asserted, in the appendix of the Report, that “the
proper measure of [income] tax is . . . the actual income of the
particular taxpayer.”59 It is self-evident, but it is worth emphasizing
further because until then, the calculation of income tax relied
heavily on various kinds of standards. 60 To accomplish the
computation of the actual income, taxpayers had to take part in the
tax administration process themselves.
Successful income tax administration rests
essentially on voluntary compliance by the taxpayer.
He is the person best informed as to his taxable status,
as to the amount of his income. The necessary
voluntary submission of the data required to measure
a taxpayer’s income is called self-assessment. In
areas where withholding does not operate, such selfassessment is vital to satisfactory tax administration.
The business man, the farmer, the higher salaried
employee, the corporation—in short, all taxpayers
require to file returns are through self-assessment
reporting to their Government the amount of their
incomes. On each such person so reporting falls a
share of the administrative task facing the nation.
The great majority of such taxpayers must
voluntarily perform their proper share of that task if
tax administration is to succeed.61
“[P]roper taxpayer compliance under a self-assessment
system is possible only if the taxpayer keeps accurate books and
records whereby he may ascertain his income.” 62 To break the
vicious circle in which taxpayers benefited from keeping no or

58
59
60
61
62

See KEIICHIRO HIRATA ET AL, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 3–4.
Id. at 212–14.
Id. at Appendix D 4–5.
Id. at Appendix D 56.
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fictitious records, Surrey proposed providing rewards for taxpayers
who kept records. This is the Blue Return System.
Rewards must be sought which will positively
encourage the taxpayer to use these tools. One
possibility is to provide special administrative
treatment to a taxpayer who keeps books and records.
Thus, a taxpayer desiring such special treatment
would register with the Tax Office his willingness to
keep accurate books and records. Such books would
be kept on a form approved by the Tax Office; it
would be one of the various forms developed as
indicated above. A taxpayer so keeping books and
records would be permitted to file his return on a
different colored form so as to differentiate him from
other taxpayers. The Tax Office would assure such
taxpayer that if he keeps such books and records and
files his tax return on the special form he will not be
subject to reassessment until after an actual field
investigation is made of his income for the year.
And if a reassessment is made, the specific reasons
therefor must be given.
A taxpayer not keeping such books and records
would, on the other hand, not be guaranteed an
investigation before reassessment but would be
subject to reassessment by the use of standards.
Moreover, such latter taxpayer would not be
permitted to take an appeal to the Regional Bureau.63
As the quote indicates, Surrey enumerated a couple of
procedural privileges to be awarded to blue return filers. A blue
return filer would be reassessed only if tax officials investigated his
books and records and found a precise amount of deficiency.
Further, tax officials had to give him specific reasons for the
reassessment while informing him of it. These privileges are two
sides of the same coin. If tax officials find a deficiency of tax from
an investigation into a taxpayer’s books and records and make a
63

Id. at Appendix D 58.
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reassessment based on this fact, it would be fairly easy for them to
notify the taxpayer of the reasons for the reassessment.
2.

Allowing the Tax Officials More Power

In Japan, the power of income tax officials over taxpayers
was severely limited. When the Income Tax Act of 1877 64 was
being deliberated upon in the Senate [Genroin],65 the Senate deleted
an article in the draft that authorized the tax officials to enjoy the
power to investigate.66 Until 1940, the income tax acts stipulated
only the power of inquiry and did not allow them to conduct
investigations. 67 The Income Tax Act of 1940, granted the tax
officials the power to investigate “books and other materials
regarding the [taxpayer’s] business” for the first time. 68 The act
also stipulated that a fine would be imposed on taxpayers who either
rejected or disturbed the investigations.69 After WWII, the Capital
Levy Act of 1946 introduced a maximum sentence of one year’s
imprisonment for any obstruction of inquiries and investigations.70
This was the first time a tax statute had employed imprisonment as a
means to secure the compliance of taxpayers. The Income Tax Act
of 1947 followed suit. Like the preceding income tax acts, it gave
tax officials powers of inquiry and investigation.71 It prescribed that
those who obstructed or did not cooperate with inquiries or
investigations would be punished with a fine or imprisonment.72
In reality, under the Income Tax Act of 1947, the powers of
inquiry and investigations of the tax officials were not exercised
appropriately. 73 Surrey summarized the state of affairs in the
following words:
64 See generally Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Imperial Order No. 5 of 1877
(Japan). It was the first income tax legislation.
65 Genroin was the only quasi-legislative body present in those times. EDWIN O.
REISCHAUER ET AL. (eds.), JAPAN: AN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA 450 (1993).
66 See generally JAPAN GENRŌIN, GENROIN KAIGI HIKKI [THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE
SENATE DEBATE], KOKI DAI 26 KAN 151 (Meiji hosei keizai shi kenkyujo ed.,1982).
67 See, e.g., HIROSHI FUJISAWA, DAI SAN SHU SHOTOKU ZEI HO CHUKAI, 126–29 (1921)
(arguing for effective measures for encouraging proper tax returns).
68 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 24 of 1940, art. 81 (Japan).
69 Id. at art. 92.
70 Zaisan zei hō [Capital Levy Act], Law No. 52 of 1946, art. 77 (Japan).
71 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 63 (Japan).
72 Id. at art. 70.
73 See also text accompanying supra note 41.
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The small and medium size business man—
shopkeeper, manufacturer, wholesaler, and so on—is
the storm center of reassessment. In practically all of
the tax offices that we have examined, the vast
majority of the income tax returns filed by the nonfarm group of self-assessed taxpayers have been
deemed inadequate by the tax officials. The amount
reported as net income is marked up by the official,
often by 50 percent or more, and not infrequently by
more than 100 percent.
This has been done
commonly, or at least fairly often, without any
current investigation of the taxpayer’s premises or
books, and without any explanation to him of how
the reassessed amount was reached. This is not to
say that overassessment occurs frequently. On the
contrary, our impression is that, even after
reassessment the net income of most of these
taxpayers has still been understated. But the hasty,
arbitrary-appearing method itself is a barrier to
obtaining that taxpayer compliance without which a
recourse to some such method is almost inevitable.
It will take time to break out of this vicious circle,
but we are of the opinion that it can be done,
provided the recent reforms in the structure of the
Japanese tax administration and the detailed
suggestion in the appendix to this report are
adopted.74
Surrey was of the opinion that the tax officials’ powers of
inquiry and investigation should be expanded further to ascertain
proper tax administration.75 To change the aforementioned situation,
he argued that tax officials had to be empowered to acquire
information held by third parties. “Information should be sought
from customers and suppliers of a business. Bank deposits should
be checked; the rules governing Tax Office access to bank records
should be changed to permit more extensive examination.”76
74
75
76

REPORT, supra note 7, at 217.
Id. at Appendix D 20–27.
Id. at Appendix D 22.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

191

Next, Surrey suggested that “[i]n order to expedite tax
investigations, authorized tax officials and procurators should have
the authority to administer oaths to which the appropriate penalty
would attach.” 77 However, his proposals also included measures
that presumably benefited the taxpayers. Among others, the
following proposal with regard to reassessment draws our attention.
The taxpayers’ right to know the basis of his tax is clearly
articulated here:
The taxpayer should be as fully informed as possible
of the reasons for the reassessment. Where the
action is based on actual investigation, the Tax
Offices are in a position fully to explain the reasons
and the computation of the new tax amount. Where
the reassessment is based on standards, the
information is necessarily more limited. But in either
case, the taxpayer is entitled to know why he has
been reassessed and how his additional tax was
computed.78
In relation to the preceding proposal, Surrey suggested that
the number of taxpayers’ protests against the reassessed amount
should be limited and that they should not be required to pay tax
until the disputes end.79 As to the former point, he proposed that
“[t]he protest should be in writing, with the reasons specified.”80 He
also recommended that appeals to the superior agency be limited or
abolished.81 Even when disputes occur, he deemed it ideal that they
be settled at the administrative stage rather than at the judicial
stage.82 He also put forward a plan to establish a court or a panel
specialized in taxation matters in order to manage them rapidly.83
In the refund suits, “the taxpayer should have the initial
responsibility of coming forward with evidence to show that the
government’s administrative decision in erroneous.”84
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at Appendix D 23.
Id. at Appendix D 27.
Id. at Appendix D 27–28.
Id. at Appendix D 27.
Id. at Appendix D 30.
Id. at Appendix D 32.
Id. at Appendix D 36–38.
Id. at Appendix D 33.
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A Tentative Summary

Surrey proposed various measures to improve the
relationship between taxpayers and tax officials. He criticized the
goal system in which the goal of tax revenue was set for each tax
office. 85 To achieve taxation based on the actual income of the
taxpayers, he emphasized voluntary compliance of taxpayers with
tax laws and the self-assessment of income tax liabilities. 86 He
offered several means to give taxpayers incentives to report their
income as correctly as possible. 87 He drew attention to dispute
resolution in the context of income tax matters. He demonstrated
how the existing reassessment could be improved. 88 He stressed
that an extensive investigation program was necessary to execute
the imposition of taxation according to the actual income.89
C. The Blue Return System in the Tax Acts
1.

The Tax Reform in 1950

The Blue Return System was introduced in the Japanese tax
system as soon as the Report was published.90 The tax reform acts
of 1950 inserted provisions in the Income Tax Act and the
Corporate Income Tax Act implementing the Blue Return System.91
The revision inserted Article 26-4 into the Income Tax Act.92 The
article stipulated that a taxpayer with business income, real property
income, or forestry income may, under the authorization of the
85

Id. at 212–14, Appendix D 5–6.
Id. at 215, Appendix D 3–5.
87 Id. at Appendix D 12–14.
88 Id. at 217–18, Appendix D 20–27.
89 Id. at 218, Appendix D 20.
90 To start the Blue Return System from the year 1950, an act and an ordinance of
Ministry of Finance were promulgated on December 15, 1949, under which keeping of
books was mandatory for those who want to join the Blue Return System. See Shotoku zei
no rinji tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Regarding the Provisional Measures on Income
Tax], Law No. 269 of 1949, art. 2 (Japan); Ordinance No. 105 of the Ministry of Finance
(Japan).
91 See generally Shotoku zei hō no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision
of the Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 71 of 1950 (Japan); Hōjin zei hō no ichibu wo
kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision of the Corporate Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 72 of
1950 (Japan).
92 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 26-4 (Japan)
(after the revision by Shotoku zei hō no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision
of the Income Tax Act of 1947]).
86
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government, file a blue return. Article 46-2, another new article,
provided that, in principle, reassessment of the income of a blue
return filer shall be allowed “only when investigations in the books
and records of him is carried out and if omission is found on the
investigations.” 93 The second paragraph of Article 46-2 made it
mandatory to note the “reasons of the reassessment” [kosei no riyu]
in the letter of notification in this case.94 The same provisions were
introduced in the Corporate Tax Act as well.95
2.

A Comparison of the New Provisions with the Report

Although the idea of the blue return undoubtedly originated
from the Report, the Blue Return System under the Income Tax Act
of 1947 (after the tax reform of 1950) was materially different from
the original proposals by Surrey in some crucial respects.
First, in his proposals, the system would be applicable only
to individual business owners. 96 He intended making the
maintenance of books and records mandatory for all corporations.
However, not only the Income Tax Act but also the Corporate
Income Tax Act opted for the Blue Return System. It meant that
some of the corporations may avoid maintaining books and records
by not joining the Blue Return System.
Second, he did not associate giving reasons exclusively with
the Blue Return System. Rather, he located it as an element in his
general plan to tax a taxpayer based on their actual income. He
argued that tax officials had no difficulty explaining to the taxpayer
the grounds for assessment against him because they had acquired
enough information on the taxpayer’s business affairs before
making the assessment.97 Taxpayers who were assessed based on
standards rather than actual amounts would also be entitled to know
the reasons for the assessment, even when there is limited
93

Id. art. 46-2.
Id. The provisions of the Income Tax Act on the Blue Return System remain almost
the same today. The Income Tax Act stipulates that the Head of Tax Office should, in case
of making a reassessment of the amount of income shown in a blue return filed by
residents, exhibit the reasons for the reassessment in the letter of reassessment. See
SHOTOKU ZEI HŌ [INCOME TAX ACT OF 1965], art. 155, ¶ 2 (Japan).
95 Hōjin zei hō [Corporate Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 28 of 1947, arts. 25,
31-3, & 32 (Japan) (after the revision by hōjin zei ho nō ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act
on the Revision of the Corporate Income Tax Act of 1947]).
96 REPORT, supra note 7, at 225.
97 Id. at Appendix D 27.
94
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information. 98 However, the tax reforms in 1950 linked the
requirement of giving reasons solely with the blue returns. The tax
acts did not guarantee that taxpayers other than blue return filers
would get to know the reasons for the assessment when the
assessment was made.
The revision did not adopt most of Surrey’s proposals to
authorize tax officials to enjoy greater powers. The tax reforms of
1950 did not delegate any additional authority to the tax office to
investigate taxpayers and third parties backed by penalties.99 Nor
did they give tax officials the authority to take sworn statements.100
They did not follow Surrey’s advice on dispute resolution either.
They did not demand that taxpayers had to specify reasons for
protests against tax offices.101 They did not declare that a taxpayer
bears the burden of proof in tax litigation, either.102 Surrey’s idea
that taxpayers should be allowed to dispute reassessment before
paying tax was not accepted.103
Thus far, we have analyzed the text of the Report
presumably as written by Surrey and scrutinized the influence of the
text over the tax reforms of 1950. However, it is not easy to discern
Surrey’s true intentions from the text alone because it was fairly
simply stated. The ideas of the officials of the Ministry of Finance
in Japan may have been included in the text. Thus, we must
examine Surrey’s earlier works on tax administration and use them
as a key to understand his true intensions in the Report.

III.

THE TRAYNOR PLAN AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE
REPORT

The articles that Surrey wrote in collaboration with Traynor
laid the foundation for his proposals in the Report of the Shoup
98

Id.
Cf. Id. at Appendix D 20 (proposing that tax evaders shall know that they are to be
ferreted out by investigation and charged with plus penalties).
100 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 23 (proposing that authorized tax officials shall have
authority administer oaths to expedite investigation).
101 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 27–28 (proposing that taxpayers should be fully informed
and entitled to know the reason for reassessment).
102 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 33 (proposing that taxpayers should bear the initial
responsibility to show evidence of government’s erroneous).
103 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 28 (arguing that it is of disadvantage for taxpayers to pay
reassessed tax before the final decision of reassessment reached, especially when the
reassessment found to be improper).
99
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Mission. In this part, I will elaborate on their opinions and compare
them with the text of the Report.
A. Traynor and Surrey’s Suggestions on Tax Administration
1.

Who is Roger Traynor?

Roger J. Traynor was born in 1900. He was a lawyer who
later became an Associate Justice and then the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of California.104 In 1931, he began to teach taxation
at the University of California.105 He also took part in drafting of
taxation statutes for California. In 1937, he was appointed as a
consultant to the Treasury Department of the federal government.106
In the same year, Surrey began to serve the Department as tax
legislative counsel.107 Traynor and Surrey soon brought forward the
Traynor Plan, a set of proposals to reform the federal tax
administration. The central aim of their plan was to clear away the
congestion of tax disputes and to rationalize the whole process of
income tax administration. 108 Their plan stirred up considerable
controversy and they eventually abandoned it.109
I will now summarize the contents of the Traynor Plan and
the related arguments put forward by Traynor and Surrey. I will
illustrate the significant features that the Traynor Plan and Surrey’s
proposal in the Report have in common. Traynor and Surrey have
written four articles on the Plan. 110 The following summary is
104 See

Les Ledbetter, Roger J. Traynor, California Justice, N.Y.TIMES (May 17, 1983)
(an obituary) (stating his achievement as a Justice); Adrian A. Kragen, Chief Justice
Traynor and the Law of Taxation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1984) (stating his achievement in
the field of taxation); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Preventive Tax Policy: Chief Justice Roger J.
Traynor’s Tax Philosophy, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2008) (summarizing the philosophy of
Traynor as the “preventive tax policy”).
105 KRAGEN, supra note 104, at 801–02.
106 Id. at 803.
107 Tax Notes, 58 TAXES 2 (1980).
108 See generally Surrey, Traynor Plan, infra note 110, 17 TAXES 393, at 441.
109 KRAGEN, supra note 104, at 804.
110 See generally Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for
Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes—A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV.
1393 (1938) (most comprehensive explanation of the plan written by Traynor with the
cooperation of Surrey) [hereinafter Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal]; Stanley S. Surrey,
The Traynor Plan: What It Is, 17 TAXES 393 (1939) (providing a concise introduction to
the Traynor Plan) [hereinafter Surrey, Traynor Plan]; Roger John Traynor & Stanley S.
Surrey, New Roads toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax
Controversies, 7 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 336 (1940) (including the proposal of the closing
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founded on the most concise version as delivered by Surrey. 111
Surrey first pointed out five problems in tax administration at that
time112. He then mentioned five fundamental drawbacks. Finally,
he offered solutions to the problems he identified113. I will use the
most comprehensive article by Traynor that was published in
Columbia Law Review as a supplement to Surrey’s article.114
2.

The Components of the Traynor Plan

For Traynor and Surrey, the first problem in tax
administration was the “present delay in the disposition of cases.”115
Since plenty of cases were pending before the Board of Tax Appeals,
it typically took nine years to dissolve a tax controversy. Second,
the vast majority of the cases were not resolved by judicial decisions
but were settled by agreement. 116 Third, deficiencies were not
collected sufficiently.117 Fourth, because of the considerable delay
in the disposition of cases, the Board failed to issue guidance when
the questions for which guidance was necessary were emerging.118
Finally, many of the petitions to the Board involved only a small
amount of tax, although agreements between the Commissioner and
the taxpayer would be more appropriate for their disposition.119
Behind these perceived problems, they found the following
defects in the existing system. First, before the Treasury’s
decentralization program, 120 a taxpayer who accepted a notice of
agreements); Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration,
25 WASH. U.L.Q. 399 (1940) (proceedings of the Surrey’s lecture followed by questions
and answers).
111 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110.
112 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393–94
113 Id. at 395.
114 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110.
115 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
at 1395–96.
116 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1393–95.
117 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1396–97.
118 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1397–98.
119 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393–94; Traynor, A Criticism and a
Proposal, supra note 110, at 1398.
120 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service) established ten field division offices and
gave the head of the division office more powers than before. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
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deficiency had every incentive to file a petition.121 He had nothing
to lose in doing so, whereas he might have got a discount for his tax
liability in the course of dispute resolution. 122 Second, the
Commissioner was not able to collect necessary factual information
on taxpayers but still issued notices of deficiency without any firm
factual foundations because the burden of proof was on the
taxpayers.123 This practice gave rise to a situation in which more
than two-thirds of the notices were abandoned in due course. 124
Third, because the Federal District Courts and the Court of Claims,
in addition to the Board of Tax Appeals, had original jurisdiction for
federal tax matters, the case law on them was not consistent across
various courts. 125 Furthermore, the existence of many federal
appellate courts and the Supreme Court’s limited issuance of
certiorari worsened the inconsistency in the case law on federal
taxation.126
The Traynor Plan, a proposal to solve problems, had two
fundamental objectives, which are as shown below.127
(1) With respect to the administrative procedure, to
bring about an objective analysis of controversies in
the administrative stage, thereby increasing the
number of cases settled in that stage and stopping the
flood of petitions to a Board which cannot possibly
handle all of them.
(2) With respect to the system of judicial review, to
establish a simplified structure which will insure
certainty and uniformity in tax decisions.128
18 (1941). See generally Arthur A. Armstrong, Decentralization of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, 19 TAXES 90 (1941).
121 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
at 1398–1400.
122 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
at 1398–1400.
123 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
at 1400–02.
124 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1400–02.
125 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1402–04.
126 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394–95; Traynor, A Criticism and a
Proposal, supra note 110, at 1404–11.
127 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395.
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To achieve the preceding two goals, the Traynor Plan
contained the following nine suggestions. The first five were
concerned with administrative procedure.129 First, the preliminary
conferences, a procedure before the issuance of informal notice of
deficiency (the thirty-day letter), had to be more fully utilized.130
Second, the informal notice of deficiency had to become a formal
practice and the protest against it had to be made mandatory for a
taxpayer to proceed to the next stage.131 The taxpayer had to show
the grounds of protest, relevant facts, and evidence for them. Third,
when the Commissioner issued a final notice of deficiency (the
ninety-day letter), it “would contain specific findings of fact on the
matters involved, so that the taxpayer will have definite advice of
the case against him.” 132 Fourth, at the petition with the Board
against the notice of deficiency, the scope of the review had to be
limited.133 They suggested the following four conditions:
(1) The taxpayer in his proof before the Board would
be limited to the grounds, documents and facts
outlined in his protest.
(2) The Commissioner in his proof would be limited
to the issue and facts contained in the findings of fact.
He could no longer present a claim before the Board
for an additional deficiency.
(3) The taxpayer, as at present, would have the
burden of proving that the findings of fact were
erroneous.
(4) To insure the collectability of any deficiency
found by the Board, it may be desirable to require the

128

Id.
Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1411–25.
130 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395.; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1411–12.
131 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1412–14.
132 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1415.
133 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1418–21.
129
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taxpayer to post a bond or other security at the time
of filing his petition with the Board.134
Surrey summarized their plans
administrative procedure as follows.

for

the

reform

of

In short, the requirement of a protest would force
disclosure of the facts either in the protest itself or in
the preliminary conference preceding it, in view of
the taxpayer’s knowledge that the facts would have
to be disclosed later in any event. The findings of
fact would force the Commissioner to make a
realistic appraisal of his case in the administrative
stage. The limitations on proof before the Board
would serve to insure the efficacy of both protest and
findings of fact.135
They did not want to make the findings of fact by the
Commissioner final. 136 They emphasized that the finality of the
findings by an agency must be backed by a formal process of
adjudication and that such a process was impossible when taxpayers
disclosed only limited information.137 Finally, they claimed that the
deficiency procedure and refund procedures had to be consistent.138
They offered four plans to improve judicial procedure. The
objectives of the plans were as follows:
(1) Reduction in the number of tribunals passing
upon tax questions, together with effective
machinery for the resolution of conflicting decisions,
in order to achieve uniformity and certainty in tax
decisions.
(2) Elimination of present method of appellate
review of Board decisions.

134

Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395.
Id.
136 Id. at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1421.
137 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1421.
138 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1422–25.
135
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(3) Guarantee of collectability of tax in cases
proceeding to the judicial stage.139
First, they proposed that original jurisdiction in tax cases be
concentrated in the Board of Tax Appeals. 140 Second, they
recommended decentralizing the Board into five divisions.141 By
doing so, they suggested that expeditious trial of petitions filed with
the Board would be possible. Third, they argued that a Court of Tax
Appeals had to be established instead of the present appellate
jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals.142 Finally, they suggested
that taxpayers had to file a bond on a petition before the Board to
guarantee collectability of their tax dues.143
B. Aftermath of the Traynor Plan
Although the Traynor Plan was largely consistent with other
proposals to improve tax administration, 144 including the
decentralization program launched by the Treasury Department,145 it
was open to fierce criticisms by the practitioners.146 The Report of
the Special Committee to Study the Traynor Plan appointed in the
American Bar Association (ABA Report), the most comprehensive
criticism against the Traynor Plan, showed that the criticism derived
from the practitioners’ strong sense of antipathy toward the
personnel in the Treasury. We will now outline the criticism by the
American Bar Association.

139

Id. at 1425.
Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1425–26.
141 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1426–27.
142 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1427–33.
143 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1433–35.
144 See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes, 13
TAXES 641, 642–43 (1935). See also Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice
Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV. 171, 180–81 (2001) (analyzing Justice Jackson’s ideas
on taxation).
145 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395.
146 See, e.g., John M. Maguire, Federal Revenue: Internal or Infernal, 21 TAXES 77,
122 (1943); REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE SO-CALLED TRAYNOR PLAN,
1940 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N PROGRAM & COMM. REP. 64, 64 (1940) [hereinafter A.B.A.]. See
also EYAL-COHEN, supra note 104, at 899.
140
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The ABA Report began with the characterization of the
Traynor Plan. 147 It pointed out the “quasi-official” nature of the
plan. 148 It found fault with the understanding of the present
situation by the plan.149 The main argument of the ABA Report was
that the “defects” found by Traynor and Surrey were not defects at
all: The number of disputes per tax revenue is not on the rise.150
The ABA Report did not find any delay in the adjustment of tax
controversies. 151 It claimed that the Commissioner had enough
power to collect necessary information from taxpayers.152
Next, the ABA Report criticized each of the proposals of the
Traynor Plan. First, the ABA Report insisted that the present
informal nature of the communications between the tax officials and
the taxpayers would be lost by the Traynor Plan’s proposal seeking
the limiting of the objectives of tax disputes.153 Second, the ABA
Report indicated that by placing the burden of proof on taxpayers,
the Traynor Plan regarded the findings by the Commissioner as
supported by substantial evidence.154 However, as we have shown,
Traynor and Surrey had clearly denied this understanding.155 Third,
the ABA Report claimed that requiring a bond before tax disputes
was not a good idea.156 Finally, the ABA Report declined all of the
Traynor Plan’s ideas on the reform of the tax judicial process.157
In short, the ABA Report rejected almost all the proposals
by the Traynor Plan without seriously considering their
appropriateness. It found no defects in the contemporary state of
affairs and therefore preferred to maintain the status quo than to
make any changes.158
As a result of the criticism, the Traynor Plan was not put into
practice. 159 Nevertheless, the plan’s spirit survived in Justice
Traynor’s opinions in the decisions of the Supreme Court of
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

A.B.A., supra note 146, at 65.
Id.
Id. at 65–69.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72.
See generally Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396.
A.B.A., supra note 146, at 73–74.
Id. at 74–77.
Id. at 64.
EYAL-COHEN, supra note 104, at 899.
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California and in the reform proposals by scholars.160 Moreover,
ideas from the Traynor Plan flew directly into the Report of the
Shoup Mission, as I will show in the next section.
C. Comparison of the Traynor Plan with Surrey’s Proposal in
the Report of the Shoup Mission
Surrey’s proposals in the Report of the Shoup Mission have
much in common with the ideas indicated in the Traynor Plan. First,
both the Traynor Plan and the Report advocated the policy of giving
a taxpayer a sufficient incentive to disclose information at the
earliest stage possible.161 It was intended to mitigate the congestion
of tax disputes and at the same time it aimed to realize taxation
according to the actual amount of income. The state of affairs in
postwar Japan in terms of congestion differed from that of the US in
the late 1930s. In the US, there were many petitions pending before
both the Bureau and the Board. 162 In Japan, the number of
reassessments were large. However, the number of petitions against
them seemed to have been small although the Report did not
indicate any precise number. The quantity of tax litigation was also
very small. 163 Nonetheless, the Report forecasted a substantial
increase in tax cases and then proposed precautionary measures
against the problem.164 From this passage, we may infer that Surrey
wrote his part of the Report with the Traynor Plan in mind.
Second, cooperation between the tax officials and the
taxpayers aimed at reaching the true amount of income was an
important component both in the Traynor Plan and in the Report. It
is true that the taxpayers must first submit necessary information to
tax officials because the taxpayers have all the necessary
information to determine their tax liability.165 However, after that,
in Surrey’s proposals, both parties were treated symmetrically in tax
160

Id. at 899–907.
REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 3–5; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1395–96.
162 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1395–96.
163 REPORT, supra note 7, at 220–21.
164 Id.
165 REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 22; Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the
Field of Tax Administration, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal,
supra note 110, at 1400–02.
161
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administration. Both were required to indicate their judgments on
tax liability, whether in the notice of deficiency or reassessment or
in protest against them, with sufficient reasons and evidence
supporting them.166 In other words, Surrey demanded that taxpayers
had to play a greater role than generally assumed in ascertaining
their actual income. The requirement of giving reasons obviously
makes the administrative tribunal and the court consider exclusively
legal issues rather than factual ones, thereby helping realize the first
point mentioned above.
Through the foregoing comparison with the Traynor Plan,
we now have a far more detailed picture of Surrey’s proposals in the
Report. He certainly proposed the Blue Return System. He also
recommended giving reasons in the letter of reassessment.
However, these were merely a means to achieve his ideals in tax
administration, that is taxation according to the taxpayers’ actual
income with fewer disputes between the tax officials and taxpayers.
Under the ideals, each taxpayer’s tax liability would be computed
based on all the relevant information of the taxpayer. The burden of
the appeal process and the judicial system would be relieved
because most of the controversies on facts were settled beforehand.
Surrey considered the requirement for giving reasons as one
of the means to limit the scope of disputes between tax officials and
taxpayers. He did not consider it as a safeguard for taxpayers
against tax authorities. It sometimes benefits taxpayers, but does so
only by chance. Neither the Report nor the Traynor Plan offered
evidence that Surrey sought the protection of taxpayers against
governmental powers. It is not clear whether he thought about the
concepts of notice and hearing, one of the basic principles in
administrative procedure.167 However, considering the absence of
references to procedural rights of private parties in informal
adjudication in contemporary materials, it may safely be assumed
that he did not.168

166

See REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 27, 33, & 58; Surrey, Traynor Plan,
supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1412–14,
1415, & 1418–21.
167 Cf. HALEY, supra note 28, at 561–63 (indicating the members of Legislation and
Justice Division of SCAP were in the opinion that Japan should provide for the concept in
legislation).
168 Cf. MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE, supra note 120. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
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IGNORANCE AND EXCESSIVE ACCEPTANCE OF
SURREY’S PROPOSALS IN POSTWAR JAPAN

A. The Long-Term Consequences of Surrey’s Proposals in the
Report
As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the crux
of Surrey’s proposals in the Report of the Shoup Mission lay in
realizing a rapid resolution of tax disputes and preventing disputes
from occurring in the first place. To bring about these ideals, he
made three proposals as below. First, he argued that the object of a
tax dispute had to be a single factual or legal issue. He tried to
realize the proposal by encouraging taxpayers to submit facts that
would form the basis of his liability. Second, he supposed a
dichotomy, in which a blue return filer, a taxpayer with sufficient
records and books, calculated his income according to them,
whereas a taxpayer without them would be subject to taxation based
on some kind of standards. Third, he proposed that the tax officials
had to have far more power to investigate and interrogate taxpayers.
His idea of giving reasons in the assessment against a blue return
filer is a component of the first proposal.169 It would have been
possible only when the third proposal is realized.
In reality, however, the third proposal was not
accomplished.170 The power of tax officials was relatively restricted.
To make matters worse, the number of tax officials and their
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941).
169 Vicki L. Beyer, The Legacy of the Shoup Mission: Taxation Inequities and Tax
Reform in Japan, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 388, 395–96 (1992).
170 Except for Ryokichi Sugimoto, a judge at the Tokyo District Court, who
persistently made arguments loyal to that of Surrey, nobody ever tried to promote Surrey’s
original idea. Cf. Ryokichi Sugimoto, Zeikin sosho ni okeru shoko moshide no junjo [The
Order of Providing Evidence in Tax Cases], 17 ZAISEI 102 (1952) (explaining the debate
over the burden of proof after the recommendation by the Shoup Mission); Ryokichi
Sugimoto, Sozeiho no kaishaku no doko [Trends in the Interpretation of Tax Law], 29
HORITSU JIHO 1074 (1957); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Sozei sosho no jittai to kihon mondai
[Present Status and Fundamental Problems of Tax litigation], 1 KINYU HOMU JIJO (7)1
(1958) (a proposal on tax litigation process very similar to Surrey’s idea); Ryokichi
Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho no chien [Delay in Administrative Litigation], 30 HORITSU
JIHO 1260 (1958); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho [Administrative Litigation], 465
HANREI JIHO 21332 (1967); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho ni okeru saibansho no
yakuwari [The Role of the Court in Administrative Litigation], 156 HOGAKU SEMINA 2
(1969).
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abilities were also limited. These factors made the fulfillment of the
second proposal impossible. Tax officials were forced to use certain
kinds of standards to calculate the income of some blue return filers
because the tax officials were not able to collect necessary
information on them. Further, some of the court decisions began to
allow taxpayers who had their liabilities assessed according to a
standard to argue that the tax liability was incorrectly assessed not
because the standard was inappropriate but because the alleged tax
liability did not reflect his true income. In other words, the courts
permitted taxpayers who did not file blue returns to rebut
reassessments by the actual amount of revenue or expenditure. This
practice of the courts, along with the use of standards for the blue
return filers, significantly blurred the distinction between blue
returns filers and non-blue returns filers. Moreover, the judges
declined to limit the object of a tax dispute to a single issue. Rather,
they preferred to judge the appropriateness of a taxpayer’s liability
of a given year as a whole. Thus, the first proposal by Surrey was
not put into practice. Thus, the legislature and the judiciary did not
employ any of Surrey’s core proposals.
Despite the apparent ignorance of Surrey’s proposals, the tax
administration of Japan in the latter half of the twentieth century
almost lived up to Surrey’s ideals. It did not experience the
congestion of tax disputes that Surrey predicted and was deeply
afraid of. It is difficult to pin down the precise reasons for the
achievement. However, I believe that the following two points
contributed toward achieving the goal.
Courts rarely declare tax liability determined in a selfassessment or reassessment void [muk ō ]. In Japan, a tax refund
claim is considered as a restitution claim. In a restitution suit, every
administrative disposition is deemed correct.171 The administrative
disposition would even be revoked if it were disputed in a suit in
which the plaintiff exclusively claimed that the disposition was
illegal. It follows that it is extremely difficult for a taxpayer to
recover the amount of tax paid through a refund suit. Then, it
becomes rational for the tax officials to strongly recommend that the
taxpayer file an amended return rather than to assess the deficiency
by themselves. When they make an assessment, the taxpayer may
challenge the assessment and then the tax dispute goes on.
171

See generally ISHIMURA, supra note 10, 125–26.
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However, if the taxpayer amends the return, the tax officials are
almost relieved from the risk of continued involvement in the
dispute.
Upon an assessment of deficiency, the tax authorities of
Japan have the power to start a collection procedure for the
deficiency amount even if the taxpayer in question does not agree
with the assessment.172 This power is horrifying especially for a
taxpayer without sufficient financial resources because it could
destroy his economic life. Thus, both tax officials and taxpayers
would, in most cases, arrive at a reasonable compromise. To avoid
the worst case scenario, it is rational for the taxpayer to admit the
existence of deficiency even if he does not entirely agree with the
alleged amount of deficiency. Since tax officials wanted to end tax
disputes, as explained above, they offered taxpayers reasonable
discounts if they consented to filing an amended return.
The ideas Surrey presented were largely ignored in the tax
administration in Japan. However, an important part of his
proposals, namely the requirement of giving reasons in the notice of
assessment was accepted and magnified greatly by the judiciary.173
In the next section, I will trace the development of the doctrine on
giving reasons and explain how it became a unique doctrine in
Japanese administrative law.

172

It is a principle applicable to the administrative dispositions in general. See Gyōsei
jiken soshō hō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 25 (Japan).
In the United States, the rule is the same as that in Japan as long as federal taxation is
concerned. See I.R.C. § 6331–44. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931)
(constitutionality of the provisions). But the Internal Revenue Code stipulates a broad
exception. See I.R.C. § 6213 (a) (prohibiting the government from proceeding to the
collection until the specified dates). Cf. supra note 103 and accompanying text for the
comment of Surrey with regard to this point. For a comprehensive explanation of the
question whether the execution of an administrative determination stays or not in various
contexts, see Reginald Parker, The Execution of Administrative Acts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV.
292 305 (1957) (“[T]he tax claim will not become delinquent without judicial review or an
opportunity for it”). See also Reginald Parker, Administrative Law Through Foreign
Glasses: The Austrian Experience, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 551, 565 (1961) (in Austria, every
administrative agency has the power to execute its own decisions); L. Harold Levinson,
Toward Principles of Public Law, 19 J. PUB. L. 327, 358–59 (1970) (in France, every
administrative decision possesses the same enforceability as a court judgment).
173 For an overview of the early cases, see Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Aoiro shinkoku ni
taisuru kosei no riyu fuki [Giving Reasons in the Assessments against the Blue Return
Filers], SOZEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 166 (Ichiro Ogawa & Hiroshi Kaneko eds., 1968).
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Development of the Common Law Doctrine on Giving
Reasons
1.

Udono case

Shortly after the introduction of the Blue Return System,
cases on the requirement of giving reasons began to appear.174 In
these cases, the Heads of Tax Office did not clearly explain their
decision-making process or the evidence supporting their positions
in their letters informing taxpayers of the assessments. In some
cases, they did not indicate any reason at all.175 Sometimes, they
notified taxpayers of the reasons at a later date.176 In these cases,
taxpayers argued that the assessments were defective and had to be
revoked. 177 At first, the National Tax Agency claimed that
provisions for giving reasons in the Income Tax Act and the
Corporate Income Tax Act were not requirements but only
instructions.178 However, not all lower court decisions followed this
claim.179 Rather, although gradually, some of the courts began to
hold that the assessments without specified reasons were defective
and thus, they revoked them.180
In 1962, the Supreme Court indicated, although in its obiter
dicta, that when a Regional Commissioner failed to note the reasons
for his ruling upon a taxpayer’s appeal, his decision turned

174

Id.
See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan).
176 See e.g., Hiroshima Chihō Saibansho [Hiroshima Dist. Ct.] May 29, 1958, Sho 30
(gyo) No. 11, 9 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 986 (Japan).
177 For the meaning of “revocation” of an administrative disposition, see text definition
in supra note 17.
178 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916.
(Japan).
179 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916.
(Japan).
180 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916.
(Japan).
175
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revocable.181 In this case, the issue was whether the Commissioner
should inform the taxpayer of the reasons for his decision in an
adversarial administrative adjudication, even though the procedure
was far less formal than that of independent administrative
committees.182 Thus, requiring the Regional Commissioner to give
reasons was entirely understandable in this case. Further, the
original tax assessment was maintained in the case.
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided upon Udono, where it
followed the decisions of the lower courts and revoked tax
assessments that did not offer a sufficient notification of reasons.183
This attitude of the Court is surprising. When an assessment is
revoked by the court, the Head of Tax Office cannot make another
because of the statute of limitation. The Court thus called for
compliance with the requirement of giving reasons at the sacrifice
of proper taxation in each of these cases.184
The facts of the Udono case are as follows. Mr. Shizuhiro
Udono was a retailer of shoes in Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo prefecture. He
was a blue return filer since 1953. On March 14, 1957, he filed his
tax return for his annual income in 1956. In this return, he alleged
that his income was 309,000 yen in 1956. On July 29, 1957,
however, the Head of Koishikawa Tax Office assessed Udono’s
deficiency based on the determination that his income in 1956 was
444,000 yen. The Head of Koishikawa Tax Office wrote, in a letter
notifying Mr. Udono of the assessment, saying, “Considering your
gross profit ratio, the amount of profit in your books is too small. I
corrected the amount with reference to your actual gross profit ratio
based on our investigation and therefore corrected the amount of
income.”185 I translated the original statements written in Japanese
181 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 26, 1962, Sho 36 (o) No. 409, 16 SaikŌ Saibansho
Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 2557 (Japan) (Amakasu sangyo kisen kabushiki gaisha
[Amakasu Industrial Steamship, Co., Ltd.] v. Shiba zemimusho cho [Head of Shiba Tax
Office]). For an excellent overview of the development of the cases beginning in this case,
see Shizuo Fujiwara, Riyu fuki hanrei ni miru gyosei tetsuzuki hosei no riron to jitsumu,
[The Theory and Practice of the APA thorough the Cases on Giving Reasons], 3 Ronkyu
jurisuto 67 (2012).
182 NATHANSON & FUJITA, supra note 33, 302–33.
183 See supra notes 14–17.
184 See generally I.R.C. § 7522(a), supra note 16.
185 17 MINSHŪ, at 620. Udono case was discussed in the subcommittee on the tax
system and the tax administration under the Finance Committee of the House of
Representatives. See generally Dai 31 kai kokkai shugiin okura iinkai zeisei narabini zei no
shikko ni kansuru sho iin kaigiroku [The Thirty-First Diet, Official Record of the Debates
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into English. However, the precise meaning of the original
statements is far from completely clear. Mr. Udono disputed the
assessment, first by asking the Head of the Tax Office for
reconsideration and, next by asking the Regional Commissioner of
Tokyo Regional Tax Bureau for reviewing the assessment. Both the
Head of the Tax Office and the Regional Commissioner rejected his
claim. To make matters worse, while informing Mr. Udono of their
decisions, neither offered any reasons or explanations.
Mr. Udono filed a lawsuit against the Regional
Commissioner. In the lawsuit, he claimed that the “reasons” that the
Head of the Tax Office had written in the letter of assessment and
the “reasons” that the Regional Commissioner had written in the
notification letter were both too abstract and their meanings were
not clear. In effect, they failed to note the reasons, and therefore the
assessment by the Head of the Tax Office and the determination by
the Regional Commissioner were both illegal and the assessment
had to be revoked. 186 In the first instance at the Tokyo District
Court, the Regional Commissioner, the defendant, argued that the
“reasons” that the two officials had given were sufficient and that
the assessment did not need to be revoked. However, the Court
affirmed the plaintiff’s claim.187
In the second instance before the Tokyo High Court, the
defendant clarified the process of calculating the allegedly correct
income.188 According to him, the tax officials at the Koishikawa
Tax Office had first found that the amount of income in Mr.
Udono’s tax return was too small when compared with that of the
other retailers with similar amounts of gross sales. They then
investigated his books and records and found several omissions
from them and estimated his gross profit ratio. By adding the
in the Subcommittee on the Tax System and the Tax Administration under the Finance
Committee of the House of Representatives], No. 2 (Feb. 18, 1959) and No. 3 (Feb. 25,
1959) (Japan). I did not find out whether the debates in the Diet had an influence on the
Supreme Court decision.
186 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 630–31 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho
[Regional Commissioner of Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]).
187 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 4, 1959, Sho 33 (gyō) no. 55, 10
Gyōsai reishū 287 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho [Regional Commissioner of
Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]).
188 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no.84, 17 Saikō Saibansho
Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 617, 633–35 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho
[Regional Commissioner of Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]).
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omissions and using this new ratio, the Head of the Tax Office
assessed Mr. Udono’s income tax for 1956. The Tokyo High Court
reversed the decision of the original instance and held that the
statements in the letter of assessment and those in the notification
letter were both sufficient reasons because the taxpayer was able to
understand the contents of the assessment by reading the
statements.189
The Supreme Court reversed this decision and unanimously
held that the statements in the letters were insufficient as proper
reasons and ruled that the assessment had to be revoked.190 The
Supreme Court first articulated the aim of giving reasons in
administrative dispositions in general.191 The Court said that in the
context of income tax, since the Income Tax Act guaranteed a
taxpayer who chose to join the Blue Return System that his books
and records would be respected, the content of the reasons in the
letter of assessment had to explain the basis for the assessment
based on materials that have more power of persuasion than the
statement in the taxpayer’s books. 192 The Court found that the
“reasons” in the letter of assessment in this case were inadequate
because from the statement, the taxpayer would not have been able
to understand the extent of omission, the account for which the
omission was found, the basis for the calculation of the amount, the
basis for the calculation of the gross profit ratio, and the justification
for using the ratio.193 Thus, the Court held that the reasons were
invalid and the assessment had to be revoked.194
Although the decision was surprisingly favorable to the
taxpayer, it was anticipated by several commentators. In a short
case comment published in April 1962, Kenzo Shiraishi, a highly
respected judge at the Tokyo District Court specialized in
administrative law, explained the significance of the requirement of

189 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 27, 1960, Sho 34 (ne) no. 356, 17
MinshŪ 632 (Japan) (Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho [Regional Commissioner of Tokyo
Regional Taxation Bureau] v. Udono).
190 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 621 (Japan).
191 Id. at 620.
192 Id. 620–21.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 622.
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giving reasons in general. 195 His remarks were followed almost
word for word in Udono. 196 Hiroshi Shiono, the then associate
professor of administrative law at the University of Tokyo, made a
comment similar to that of Shiraishi in September 1962.197
2.

Development of the Common Law Doctrine after Udono

The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Udono in
Kameya Sewing Shop, a corporate income tax case.198 In Kameya
Sewing Shop, the Court cited Udono and held that a reassessment
without sufficient reasons had to be revoked irrespective of the fact
that the taxpayer in question was able to estimate the reasons at the
time of the reassessment.199
Contemporary commentators (other than the officials of the
National Tax Agency) welcomed the common law doctrine offered
by Udono that an assessment would be revoked when one of the
requirements for it was defective. 200 This doctrine was not selfevident because it may well be argued that a slight defect in the
procedural requirement does not make the assessment revocable.
Further, almost all commentators agreed with the Supreme Court.
201
The conclusion is not obvious because even if one wants to
penalize the tax authorities for failing to give sufficient reasons,
there are other ways to do so, such as forcing them to pay damages
to the taxpayers or imposing a punishment on the officials in charge
internally. However, nobody suggested such alternatives.
There was a slight but sharp disagreement in theorizing the
core idea of the Udono decision. Some commentators understood
195

Kenzo Shiraishi, Sogan saiketsusho no riyu fuki [Giving Reasons in Administrative
Adjudication], in GYOSEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 165, 166 (1962).
196 This fact is pointed out by Shizuo Fujiwara. See FUJIWARA, supra note 181.
197 SHIONO, supra note 24.
198 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SaikŌ Saibansho
Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 1871 (Japan) (Kabushiki gaisha kameya ito ten [Kameya
Sewing Shop, Co., Ltd.] v. Maebashi zeimusho chō [Head of Maebashi Tax Office]). In
this decision, one out of five justices dissented. Justice Sakunosuke Yamada argued that
the statement in the letter of assessment (“lack of the amount of sale by 190,500 yen”) was
acceptable as the “reason” of the assessment.
199 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1871, 1873 (Japan) (Kabushiki gaisha kameya ito
ten [Kameya Sewing Shop, Co., Ltd.] v. Maebashi zeimusho chō [Head of Maebashi Tax
Office]).
200 See, e.g., KANEKO, supra note 11.
201 Id.
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the decision as an example of formal errors or defects.202 In other
words, they located the decision in a series of cases in which the
validity of an administrative disposition lacking some of its formal
requirements was the issue. According to the traditional account of
the issue of formal errors, which was originally imported from
German administrative law, 203 an administrative disposition was
considered void when the formal errors in question are crucial,
whereas it is considered valid when errors are trivial.204 However,
the commentators on the Udono decision declined the dichotomy
and instead claimed that an administrative disposition with formal
errors may be revocable when the parties concerned dispute the
validity of the disposition. This argument is not convincing because
it is quite difficult if not impossible to explain why a valid
administrative disposition turns revocable once the parties
concerned begin to dispute its validity.
That is why other commentators deemed Udono as a
variation of a general principle of administrative procedure. For
example, in a case comment on another Supreme Court decision,
Hiroshi Kaneko, then associate professor of tax law at the
University of Tokyo, wrote as follows:
Though the requirement of giving reasons in an
administrative disposition is one of the formal
requirements, it has considerable significance and
should be distinguished from merely formal
requirements such as the statement of the date of the
disposition.
In view of that the aim of the
requirement is to guarantee the substantive
appropriateness of an administrative disposition, the

202

See, e.g., JIRO TANAKA, SHIMPAN GYOSEIHO VOL. 1, 148 (2nd Revised ed., 1974).
For one of the most comprehensive narrative of this position, see NISHITOBA, supra note 21.
203 For the influence of German law on the modern administrative law of Japan, see
John Ohnesorge, Administrative Law in East Asia: A Comparative-Historical Analysis,
COMP. ADMIN. L. 78, 82–83 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2011). For a
description of the treatment of procedural errors in Germany, see, e.g., PÜNDER, infra note
218, 953–55.
204 See, e.g., SHOZABURO SUGIMURA, SHIN HANREI TO GYOSEI HO NO SHO MONDAI [New
Cases and Various Questions on Administrative Law] 14–18 (1943) (discussing the
standard to be applied in distinguishing the valid administrative dispositions and the void
ones).
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requirement can be regarded as one of the
requirements for administrative procedure.205
Nevertheless, the commentators who located Udono in the
context of administrative procedure did not precisely articulate
which of the principles in administrative procedure was in question.
They vaguely found the requirement of giving reasons to be one of
the questions of administrative procedure. This vague attitude gave
rise to a couple of serious consequences. One is that they did not
pay attention to the level of formality of the administrative
procedure in question. They praised the private party’s protection
even if the situation in question was a rather informal one as long as
an administrative disposition was delivered. The other is that most
of them were not interested in the chance of the party concerned to
convey his opinion to the administrative agency.206 In other words,
most of them were concerned not with notice and hearing but with
notice alone.
The Supreme Court pushed its strict attitude toward the
requirement of giving reasons still further in 1972. In a case in
which the Head of Tax Office claimed that the defect of an original
assessment caused by the insufficient statement of reasons for the
assessment had been cured by the meticulous reasons stated in the
following decision of the administrative adjudication, the court
denied the claim unanimously, holding thus:207
Given the aforementioned purpose of the
requirement of giving reasons in the assessments, it
is not appropriate to admit curing of the defect in an
assessment
(disposition)
delivered
by
an
205

Hiroshi Kaneko, Gyosei koi no kashi [Defects in Administrative Disposition], in
GYOSEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 248, 249 (Enlarged ed., 1965). See also Hiroshi Shiono, Riyu no
nai gyosei shobun wa nai [No Administrative Disposition without Reason], in GYOSEIHO
WO MANABU [Learning Administrative Law] vol. 1 254, 257 (Hiroshi Shiono ed., 1978)
(locating the requirement of giving reasons as one of the doctrines on administrative
procedure); KANEKO, supra note 11, 21–24.
206 Cf. Kenzo Shiraishi, Zeimu sosho no tokushitsu [The Traits of Tax Litigation],
7(12) ZEIRI 8 (1964) (arguing that the whole process of the communication between the tax
officials and the taxpayer should be evaluated when the validity of a tax assessment is
determined).
207 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 5, 1972, Sho 43 (gyō tsu) no. 61, 26 Saikō
Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 1795 (Japan) (Oita zeimusho cho [Head of Oita Tax
Office] v. Yamatoyo shoken kabushiki gaisha [Yamatoyo Securities, Co. Ltd.]).
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administrative agency through an act by another
agency. For one thing, such a rule would be at odd
with the purpose of the requirement, that is to make
sure the first agency delivers the assessment with
care and reasonableness. For another, under such a
rule, the taxpayer in question would not be able to
claim the grounds for his dissatisfaction with the
assessment fully before he knows the concrete
reasons of the assessment through the administrative
adjudication.208
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan confirmed and
strengthened the common law doctrine as established in Udono.
According to the doctrine, an assessment of deficiency will be
revoked as long as sufficient reasons are not given in the letter
notifying the taxpayer of the assessment, even if the taxpayer is
notified of the full reasons at a later date in the same administrative
procedure.
In 1985, the Supreme Court admitted clearly that the
common law doctrine Udono established for the blue returns was
applicable to administrative dispositions in general, although the
extent of reasons required would differ on a case-by-case basis.209
In the First-Class Architect decision, it held Udono intact even after
the enactment of the APA.210 However, what the Court demanded
in First-Class Architect was not to point out the facts found by the
administrative agency, but to disclose the standards that the agency
has established internally. 211 In other words, despite its apparent
concurrence with the traditional common law doctrine, First-Class
Architect may have considerably extended or changed its meaning.
In its revision of the tax acts in 2011, the Diet made Articles
8 and 14 of the APA, the provisions stipulating the requirement of
giving reasons, applicable to assessments of deficiency and initial
assessments [kettei]. Therefore, now the Head of Tax Office must
give reasons to all taxpayers, both blue return and non-blue return
208

Id. at 1798.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1985, Sho 57 (gyō tsu) no. 70, 39 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1, 3–4 (Japan).
210 First-Class Architect Case, supra note 22, at 2094. See also text accompanying
supra notes 19–22.
211 First-Class Architect Case, supra note 22, at 2094–95.
209
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filers.
As of 2019, neither the National Tax Agency nor
commentators have found any theoretical principles explaining the
different levels of giving reasons for each group of taxpayers.212
C. Uniqueness of the Doctrine
The common law doctrine on giving reasons in Japan is
exceptional compared with the practices of other countries. Given
the profound consequences that an assessment has on the taxpayer,
the attitude toward the requirement of giving reasons is somewhat
understandable.213 However, it is undeniable that the doctrine has
no counterparts in other countries.214
In the United Kingdom, they have a similar case law
doctrine on giving reasons, but the doctrine is applied on a case-bycase basis and the penalty for the failure to give reasons is relatively
light.215
In the U.S., the APA does stipulate a strict rule for giving
reasons that is applicable only to determinations made through
formal adjudication. In other words, the requirement for giving
reasons is relevant only if a procedure in question is substantially
similar to a judicial one in which the notification of the reasons for
the tribunal’s judgment is essential. The requirement is also applied
when the administrative process in question is of rulemaking. As a
result, when the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
sends a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer, the Commissioner has to
state the reasons for the determination of the tax he owes, but his
failure to do so does not make the notice of deficiency invalid or
212

See Hideaki Sato, Gyosei tetsuzuki ho ni yori kazei shobun ni motomerareru riyu
fuki no teido [The Extent of Reasons Required by the APA], 144 ZEIMU JIREI KENKYU 19
(2015) (introducing the amendment to the APA in 2011 and providing an overview of the
related lower court cases).
213 See text accompanying supra note 172.
214 See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–659
(1995) (discussing the meaning of giving reasons in general and the logic of giving
reasons). Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 99–101
(2007) (a comparative legal analysis of the idea of giving reasons, including similarities
between conceptions of “good administration” in the United States and in the European
Union). Professor Mashaw’s interest lies not in whether the statement of the reasons exists,
but in whether the alleged reasons are in fact reasonable. See Jerry Mashaw, The Rise of
Reason Giving in American Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
268 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, & Blake Emerson eds., 2nd ed. 2017).
215 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 199–229 (4th ed. 2018).
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revocable. 216
The reason for this treatment is that the
Commissioner’s determination before the notice of deficiency is an
informal adjudication at best. Even in the context of the APA, the
courts usually do not invalidate administrative decision-making just
because there are defects in the procedure. The harmless error
doctrine embodied in Section 706 of the APA prevents
administrative adjudications with small errors from being
revoked.217
The situation is almost the same in civil law countries such
as Germany and France. In Germany, they recognize “procedural
errors” in administrative decisions. 218 However, the procedural
errors rarely render the decisions void or revocable. Article 45 of
the German APA stipulates that the errors are curable during the
procedure that follows.219 Article 46 of the German APA provides
that harmless errors are ignored. 220 In France, the treatment of
procedural errors is almost the same as that in the U.S., the UK, and
Germany.221
In sum, Japan is the only jurisdiction that makes harsh
demands of administrative agencies to give reasons whenever they
make an administrative decision with an external effect. The
common law doctrine on giving reasons is far more peculiar when
we consider that in Japan the protection of citizen’s procedural
rights is relatively limited.222

216

See generally I.R.C. § 7522(a), supra note 16.
See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009).
218 Hermann Pünder, German Administrative Procedure in a Comparative Perspective:
Observations on the Path to a Transnational Ius Commune Proceduralis, 11 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 940, 953–55 (2013) (a comparative study of the question as to which
consequences ought to be imposed upon procedural errors in Germany and in the United
States). In Germany, a decision of the administration is considered to be an “administrative
act,” which is a concept equivalent to an administrative disposition in Japan. See HERMANN
PÜNDER & ANIKA KLAFKI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN GERMANY, in COMPARATIVE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER
STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, 49, 52 (René Seerden, ed., 4th ed. 2018).
219 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
(VwVfG)
§ 45,
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/vwvfg/__45.html [https://perma.cc/6PDJ-ZKEE). See PÜNDER, supra note 218,
at 953.
220 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz
(VwVfG)
§ 46,
https://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/vwvfg/__46.html [https://perma.cc/TU37-QBCY). See PÜNDER, supra note 218,
at 953.
221 Id. at 957–58.
222 See generally articles cited in supra note 19.
217
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D. An Analysis
Japanese people did not understand Surrey’s original ideas.
The Diet did not give tax officials sufficient power to collect
information from taxpayers. Even today, all tax officials can do is
to resort to the power of investigation backed by very weak
penalties for denying the investigation.223 Courts put the burden of
proof in tax cases on the tax office or the government.224 The courts
have traditionally considered a taxpayer’s tax liability in a given
year, rather than a legal evaluation of one of the foundations for
such liability as the object of tax dispute. In other words, the scope
of the judicial review of tax disputes is not limited. Under these
conditions, it is impossible to realize Surrey’s idea because
taxpayers have lesser incentive to produce information than Surrey
originally hoped for.
Yet, a question remains. Why did the Japanese people, both
courts and commentators, stick to a literal and harsh enforcement of
the giving reasons requirement in the Blue Return System? One
possible, and most natural, answer is that they were influenced by
the jurisprudence of procedural due process in the U.S.225 Although
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan is applicable only to criminal
procedures, some commentators have argued that it is also
applicable to administrative procedures. 226 However, it was not
until 1992 when the Supreme Court first held that the article might
be applicable to administrative procedures under certain

223

See, e.g., Kokuzei tsūsoku hō [Act on General Rules for National Taxes], Law No.
66 of 1962, art. 74–2 (Japan) (authorizing tax officials for income tax investigation) and art.
128, nos. 2 & 3 (Japan) (stating penalty of imprisonment for one year or less, or fine of
500,000 yen or less for not cooperating with the investigation provided in art. 74(2), etc.).
224 SAIKO SAIBANSHO JIMU SOKYOKU [Supreme Court General Secretariat], 11 GYOSEI
SAIBAN SHIRYO 49–52 (1950) (Japan) (Kunio Yano claimed the burden of proof in tax cases
was on the defendant. Yano, then a member of the general secretariat of the Supreme Court,
was in charge of administrative litigation). Cf. text accompanying supra note 84.
225 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
226 Nakamura v. Murakami (Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (a) no.
2961, 16 SaikŌ Saibansho Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] (1593) (Japan) is an important
decision of the Supreme Court on the article handed down almost the same time as Udono.
In Nakamura, the Court held that forfeiture of a third party’s belongings without notice and
hearing to him violates article 31 of the Constitution and it invalidated the forfeiture. For
English translation of Nakamura, see http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=19
[https://perma.cc/C5NA-T52L].
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conditions. 227 Besides, it has been agreed that administrative
procedure attracted little interest in Japan until the 1970s.228 The
level of safeguards that the procedural due process clause provides
to taxpayers is not high.229 Thus, it would be difficult to see a direct
link between the due process clause under the Constitution of the
United States and the discourse on giving reasons in Japan.
My hypothesis on the above question is that Japanese courts
and commentators took a rigid attitude toward giving reasons
because of three factors which are presented below. American law
influenced the first two factors, while the third is peculiar to Japan.
First, several provisions of the Constitution and general
principles of administrative procedure were collectively recognized
as measures to protect citizens’ procedural rights in Japan. A
similar phenomenon was found in the US in the Lochner era. For
example, in Boyd v. United States, 230 the US Supreme Court
combined the Fourth Amendment rule against unreasonable seizure
with the self-incrimination clause under the Fifth Amendment. 231
Although recognizing various provisions and principles as a group
does not necessarily mean failure to see the distinctiveness of each,
it may make it easier to apply an element of a provision to another
provision’s context.232
Second, the exclusionary rule, or the rule of sacrificing a
substantively correct judgment in the present in favor of deterring
unfavorable actions by officials in the future233 had a great impact

227 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 1, 1992, Sho 61 (gyō tsu) no. 11, 46 SaikŌ
Saibansho Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 437 (Japan). See also KATSUMI CHIBA, HEISEI 4
(1992) NENDO SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU MINJI HEN [SUPREME COURT CASE
COMMENTARY CIVIL EDITION (1992)] (Hosokai ed., 1995) 220, 246–57 (Japan); SHIGENORI
MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 112–13 (2011).
228 Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences:
Japanese, American, and European, 53 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 31–32 (1990).
229 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
230 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
231 See Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 787–
91 (1994) (a critical analysis that there is a better way to think about the Fourth
Amendment by returning to its first principles).
232 But see Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1885, 1907–28 (2014) (arguing that the exclusionary rule has its roots in the interaction
between the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses).
233 They are often called “prophylactic” rules. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and
Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 30 (2001) (defending the
legitimacy of prophylactic doctrinal rules in constitutional law).
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on Japanese lawyers.234 They must have found the idea of securing
the integrity of the legal process by giving up a benefit in the near
future to be enlightening, and very “American,” and therefore quite
attractive. The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule in the
context of criminal procedure for the first time in 1978.235 However,
six out of the fifteen Justices of the Court insisted on the adoption of
the rule as early as in 1961.236
Third, the failure of the Japanese to follow Surrey’s advice is
partly accredited to the different lines drawn between civil and
criminal laws in Japan and in the U.S. Japanese scholars and
practitioners had relatively easily drawn an analogy with criminal
law in understanding administrative law, especially when an
administrative act may bring about a seemingly adverse impact on
the citizens. The concept of an “adverse impact” is broad enough to
include acts such as the ascertainment of tax liability. It appears
that they have deemed administrative law to effectively be a branch
of criminal law.237 In the U.S., there is also a distinction between
civil and criminal laws. Administrative law is definitely a branch of
civil law. Even though the distinctions between a regulation, a
typical administrative action, and a punishment are sometimes

234 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–39 (2011) (indicating the
deterrence of future Fourth Amendment violations is the sole purpose of the exclusionary
rule).
235 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 7, 1978, Sho 51 (a) no. 865, 32 SaikŌ Saibansho
Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] 1672 (Japan).
236 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 1961, Sho 31 (a) no. 2863, 15 SaikŌ Saibansho
Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] 915 (Japan). As the law clerk’s report on the decision pointed out,
two of the Justices (Katsushige Kotani and Daisuke Kawamura) insisted on exclusion of
illegally acquired materials without exception, an idea more radical than that of the
Supreme Court of the United States at that time. TADASHI KURITA, SHOWA 36 (1961)
NENDO SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU KEIJI HEN [SUPREME COURT CASE COMMENTARY
CRIMINAL EDITION (1961)] (Hosokai ed., 1973) 141, 147.
237 It is not easy to discern where this idea came from. In the workshop held at Harvard
Law School on September 29, 2018, Professor Mark Levin indicated the influence of the
Chinese tradition. See HALEY, supra note 1, at 19–32; MARK LEVIN, Continuities of Legal
Consciousness: Professor John Haley’s Writings on Twelve Hundred Years of Japanese
Legal History, 8 Wash. Univ. Global Stud. L. Rev. 317 (2009). It might be accredited to
the tradition of German law, in which the conceptual framework of criminal law was
employed in the scholarly investigations in the substantive tax law. See generally ALBERT
HENSEL, STEUERRECHT (3rd ed. 1933) (providing a systematic discussion of tax law partly
based on criminal law in Germany); SHOZABURO SUGIMURA, DOITSU SOZEI HO RON
[GERMAN TAX LAW] (1931) (translating the second edition of the Hensel’s textbook on tax
law).
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blurred,238 there are many administrative actions that are far from
the punishment of criminals, such as the ascertainment of tax
liability of a taxpayer for a given year. American lawyers would not
consider issuing a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer to be analogous
with his prosecution.
In sum, the strict attitude of the Supreme Court of Japan
toward the requirement of giving reasons might be ascribed to three
factors: understanding procedural provisions as a whole; influence
of the exclusionary rule; and the adverse impacts of administrative
actions associated with criminal punishment.

V.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have argued the following two points. First,
I have shown that Stanley Surrey wrote a part of the Report of the
Shoup Mission based on articles he published during the project he
had carried out with Roger Traynor. Second, I have described how
Surrey’s original idea was interpreted in a totally different context
and how it gave birth to a sui generis doctrine on giving reasons in
administrative procedures.
Although the Japanese experience is unique, we can learn
important lessons from it. Recently, several tax law scholars began
to criticize “tax exceptionalism,” an implicit notion that the general
principles of administrative law are not necessarily applied to tax
cases. 239 In Mayo, the Supreme Court took up the invitation to
abandon the tax exceptionalism in the context of the Chevron
deference.240 However, the courts are, entirely reasonably, reluctant
to extend the reasoned explanation doctrine to the notice of
deficiency. 241 Against this backdrop, it may be argued that the
process of determining the tax liability of a taxpayer is entirely
different from the traditional administrative process in which an
238 See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of
Desert, 76 BU L. Rev. 201, 202–05 (1996) (providing an overview of explanations
academics offer of the distinction); AUSTIN SARAT ET AL., LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS
REGULATION (2011).
239 See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up
to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994); Kristin Hickman, The Need for
Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV.1537, 1618
(2006).
240 Mayo Foundation v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 46 (2011).
241 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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administrative agency tries to realize its policy goals through
command and control over the regulated parties.242 In determining
the tax liability, a taxpayer and the tax officials do cooperate with
each other. A taxpayer discloses the factual information that is
necessary in determining her tax liability in a given year to the tax
officials. The tax officials then offer her the necessary legal
information through statutes, regulations, letter rulings, and so on.
Thus, the process of the determination of tax liability has embodied
a collaborative relationship between the citizen and the
administrative agency. The process of determining tax liability is
best conceived as an example of the “third generation of
administrative procedure.” 243 The Japanese experience reinforces
the idea by clarifying the problem of considering the process of
determining the tax liability in the context of the traditional
command-and-control model of administrative procedure.

242 See Javier Barnes, Towards a Third Generation of Administrative Procedure, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 336, 344–45 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L.
Lindseth eds., 2011) (describing the traditional administrative procedure).
243 Id. See also JAVIER BARNES, Three Generations of Administrative Procedures, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 302 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, &
Blake Emerson, 2nd ed. 2017) (explaining the “third generation of administrative
procedure” expression).
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